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Abstract
Model checking suﬀers from the state explosion problem, due to the exponential increase in the size of a
ﬁnite state model as the number of system components grows. Directed model checking aims at reducing
this problem through heuristic-based search strategies. The model of the system is built while checking
the formula and this construction is guided by some heuristic function. In this line, we have deﬁned
a structure-based heuristic function operating on processes described in the Calculus of Communicating
Systems (CCS), which accounts for the structure of the formula to be veriﬁed, expressed in the selective
Hennessy-Milner logic. We have implemented a tool to evaluate the method and veriﬁed a sample of well
known CCS processes with respect to some formulae, the results of which are reported and commented.
Keywords: model checking, heuristic search, CCS, logic.
1 Introduction
Model checking [9] is a method to formally verify ﬁnite state concurrent systems. It
suﬀers from the well-known state explosion problem caused by representing concur-
rency by interleaving. Not surprisingly, most of the research in model checking is
focused on ways to minimize the impact of state explosion, as for example symbolic
model checking [25], on-the-ﬂy [23], local model checking [33], partial order [15,28],
abstraction [8] and compositional reasoning [10,29]. Recently, great interest was
shown in combining the two areas: model checking and heuristics to guide the ex-
ploration of the state graph of a system. For software validation, in the work of
Yang and Dill [34] the bug-ﬁnding capability of a model checker is enhanced by
using heuristics to search the states that are most likely to lead to an error. In
[14] the concept of directed model checking has been introduced. Traditional model
checking algorithms perform an uninformed state space exploration based on depth-
ﬁrst or breadth-ﬁrst search algorithms. In directed model checking, heuristic search
algorithms, such as A* [27], are used in order to guide the search to the shortest,
or close to the shortest, path into a property-violating state. Several approaches
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have been proposed in the area of heuristic search for explicit state model check-
ing, see for example [13,16,24]. Our work diﬀers from those in that we provide an
approach where heuristic searches are used to accelerate veriﬁcation rather than
ﬁnding errors.
In this paper we present our contribution to the veriﬁcation of concurrent sys-
tems described as Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) [26] processes. We
use the Selective Hennessy-Milner (SHM) [5] logic to express the properties to be
veriﬁed. Following the classiﬁcation in [32], the properties we manage successfully
are weak liveness and safety. The idea of our approach is to avoid, if possible,
the generation of the whole system’s global state graph for veriﬁcation. We use an
heuristic function to prune the state space and to guide the state expansion towards
the closest interesting states for the SHM formula at hand. The SHM formula to
be veriﬁed is reduced along the state expansion according to some rules and it is
taken into account for the generation of the transitions. We stop the construction
of the state space as soon as we can deduce whether the original SHM formula is or
not satisﬁed by the system.
If the heuristic function is consistent 1 , the optimality of the solution is guar-
anteed when applying a search algorithm such as A*. In this paper we present one
heuristic deﬁnition and examples that prove that this approach can really improve
the search compared to exhaustive searches. Other (consistent) heuristic deﬁni-
tions at diﬀerent levels of accuracy are presented in [20]. Our heuristic functions
are syntactically deﬁned, i.e., based on the CCS speciﬁcations and the structure
of the formula. Also, they can be automatically computed, thus user intervention
and manual eﬀorts are not needed. A tool implementing our approach has been
developed and real-life benchmark case studies have been considered for evaluation
purposes.
2 Background
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of heuristic searches
and we refer to [27] for details.
2.1 The Calculus of Communicating Systems
We brieﬂy recall the basic concepts about the Calculus of Communicating Systems
(CCS) [26]. The syntax of processes is:
p ::= nil | α.p | p + p | p|p | p\L | p[f ] | x
where α ranges over a ﬁnite set of actions A = {τ, a, a, b, b, ...}, τ is called the
internal action. The set of visible actions, V, is deﬁned as A − {τ}, L ⊆ V and
the relabeling function f is a total function, f : A → A. Given L ⊆ V, with L we
denote the set {l | l ∈ L}. x ranges over a set of constant names: each constant x
1 A heuristic function is consistent if it the diﬀerence in the heuristic estimate between one state and its
descendant is less than or equal to the actual path cost on the edge connecting them.
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is deﬁned by a constant deﬁnition x
def
= p. The semantics of a process p is precisely
deﬁned by means of the structural operational semantics shown in Figure 1. The
semantic deﬁnition describes the transition relation of the automaton corresponding
to a CCS process p, called standard transition system for p, and denoted by S(p).
Act
α.p
α
−→ p
Sum
p
α
−→ p′
p + q
α
−→ p′
and sym. Par
p
α
−→ p′
p | q
α
−→ p′ | q
and sym.
Com
p
l
−→ p′, q
l
−→ q′
p | q
τ
−→ p′ | q′
Con
px
α
−→ p′
x
α
−→ p′
x
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= px Res
p
α
−→ p′
p\L
α
−→ p′\L
α ∈ (L ∪ L)
Rel
p
α
−→ p′
p[f ]
f(α)
−→ p′[f ]
Fig. 1. Standard operational semantics of CCS
Given a process p, we use First(p) = {α|p
α
−→ p′} to denote the set of all the
ﬁrst actions that p can perform. It can be syntactically deﬁned as the deﬁnition of
sort given in [26].
Given a process p, a constant x of p is said to be guarded in p if x is contained in a
sub-process of p of the form α.q, where q is a process. A process p is guarded if every
constant of p is guarded in p, it is unguarded otherwise. In the following, Unfoldx (p)
is the process obtained by replacing each unguarded constant x by its deﬁnition.
For example, if x
def
= a.x, Unfoldx ((a.b.x |x )\{a}) is the process (a.b.x|a.x)\{a}.
From now on, for each process q = (q1| · · · |qn) we assume that if an action α
belongs to the sort 2 of qi, with i ∈ [1..n] and α belongs to the sort of qj with
j ∈ [1..n] and i = j, then the process q occurs under a restriction set L such that
L ∪ L contains α. If both α and α appear in a process, it is reasonable to assume
that they are communication actions.
2.2 Selective Hennessy-Milner logic
The selective Hennessy-Milner logic (SHM logic) is a sub-logic of the selective mu-
calculus, introduced by the author and others in [5], which is more expressive than
the Hennessy-Milner logic [32]. The syntax of the SHM logic is the following, where
K and R range over sets of actions:
ϕ ::= tt | ff | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | [K]R ϕ | 〈K〉R ϕ
The satisfaction of a SHM formula ϕ by a state s of a transition system, written
s |= ϕ, is so deﬁned:
• each state satisﬁes tt and no state satisﬁes ff;
• a state satisﬁes ϕ1 ∨ (∧) ϕ2 if it satisﬁes ϕ1 or (and) ϕ2;
2 The sort of a CCS process p is the alphabet of p [26].
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• [K]R ϕ is satisﬁed by a state which evolves to a state obeying to ϕ, for every
performance of a sequence of actions not belonging to R ∪ K, followed by an
action in K.
• 〈K〉R ϕ is satisﬁed by a state which can evolve to a state obeying to ϕ by per-
forming a sequence of actions not belonging to R ∪K, followed by an action in
K.
The selective modal operators 〈K〉R ϕ and [K]R ϕ substitute the standard modal
operators 〈K〉 ϕ and [K] ϕ. We use this logic since only the actions explicitly
mentioned by the selective modal operators can be used by the heuristic function
suggesting the more promising nodes. We give some examples of SHM formulae to
explain the use of the selective operators.
ϕ1 = [b]{a} ff: “it is not possible to perform an action b if an action a has not been
previously performed”.
ϕ2 = [a]{b} 〈c〉∅ tt: “for each action a not preceded by an action b, it is possible to
perform an action c preceded by any action”.
ϕ3 = 〈a〉{c} tt: “it is possible to perform an action a not preceded by an action c”.
For example, the process: p = a.b.c.nil + c.a.b.nil satisﬁes ϕ1 and ϕ3 while it does
not satisfy ϕ2.
3 A heuristic function for model checking CCS pro-
cesses
The idea of the approach is to avoid the construction of the whole transition system
when verifying the formulae, considering only the part of it that is suﬃcient to draw
the right conclusions. For this purpose, we use a heuristic function suggesting which
states to visit in order to be able to establish if the formula is satisﬁed or not as
soon as possible during the construction of the state space. In our heuristic, the
ﬁrst actions occurring in the formula suggest the most promising nodes to expand.
Given a CCS process p and a SHM formula ϕ we formalize the formula veriﬁ-
cation as a state space search problem, as a quadruple (N ,O, N0,G) where N is
the set of nodes, i.e. a tuple 〈s, ψ〉 with s is a state belonging to the transition
system S(p) and ψ is a sub-formula of ϕ; O is a set of operators N −→N deﬁned
in Figure 2; N0 = 〈p, ϕ〉 is the initial node; and G is a subset of N , called goal
nodes. In the following we will deﬁne when a node is a goal node for the formula
veriﬁcation problem.
We informally explain the rules in Figure 2. In the diamond1 rule, if p can
perform α to become p′, where α ∈ K, i.e., α is the ﬁrst action of ϕ, then the tuple
〈p, 〈K〉R ϕ〉 can perform α to become 〈p
′, ϕ〉 where the formula is replaced with the
remaining part after the ﬁrst action α. If α ∈ K∪R, as in the diamond2 rule, then
the tuple 〈p, 〈K〉R ϕ〉 can perform α to become 〈p
′, 〈K〉R ϕ〉 where the formula has
not changed. This is the same for the box1 and box2 rules. It is worth noting that
in the diamond rules the case of α ∈ R has not been included. This is because if
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Fig. 2. Operational semantics of 〈p, ϕ〉.
p could perform an action belonging to R that transition would not inﬂuence the
truth-value of the formula. The case of α ∈ R has not been included in the box rule
too, since in this case that transition of p always satisﬁes the formula [K]R ϕ. The
or (resp. and) rule, on the state 〈p, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2〉 (resp. 〈p, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2〉) generates all the
transitions for 〈p, ϕ1〉 and 〈p, ϕ2〉. The diﬀerence between them is in the deﬁnition
of a goal for the formula veriﬁcation. For example, consider the process p = a.nil
and the formulae ψ1 = 〈a〉∅ tt∨ 〈b〉∅ tt and ψ2 = 〈a〉∅ tt∧ 〈b〉∅ tt. Both 〈p, ψ1〉 and
〈p, ψ2〉 give rise to the following two transitions:
a
−→〈nil, tt〉 and
b
−→〈nil, 〈b〉∅ tt〉.
Nevertheless, only 〈p, ψ1〉 is a successful node (see the deﬁnition of test at the end
of this section).
We formally deﬁne the heuristic function ĥ.
Deﬁnition 3.1 [ĥ(〈p, ϕ〉] Let p be a CCS process, ϕ a SHM formula, ρ and L sets
of visible actions, C a set of pairs {〈x,L′〉}, where x is a constant occurring in p,
and L′ ⊆ V, and U a set of constants. First, we deﬁne the auxiliary function ĥ with
ﬁve arguments, ĥ(p,L, ρ, C,U), inductively on p, as in Figure 3. Then, ĥ(〈p, ϕ〉)
is deﬁned as ĥ(p, ∅, ρ, ∅, ∅), where ρ is the set of the ﬁrst actions occurring on the
formula ϕ 3 .
The heuristic function ĥ(p,L, ρ, C,U) is parametric with respect to a restriction
environment L, (L ⊆ V), keeping the set of actions on which some restriction holds.
The function is initially applied to a process with L = ∅ and L is modiﬁed when
the function is applied to p\L (Rule R5), adding to L the actions in L ∪ L. Note
that we expand the body of a constant x each time the environment under which
that constant is evaluated has changed (Rule R7). Each constant already expanded
is stored in C together with the current environment. Initially, C = ∅. The set ρ
contains the ﬁrst actions occurring on the formula under veriﬁcation. Intuitively,
3 More precisely, let ϕ and ϕ′ be SHM formulae. The set of the ﬁrst actions occurring in ϕ is inductively
deﬁned as follows:
F(tt) = F(ff) = ∅
F(〈K〉R ϕ) = F([K]R ϕ) = K
F(ϕ ∨ ϕ′) = F(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) = F(ϕ) ∪ F(ϕ′)
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R1. ĥ(nil,L, ρ, C,U) = ∞
R2. ĥ(α.p,L, ρ, C,U) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if α ∈ ρ ∪ L
1 + ĥ(p,L, ρ, C,U) otherwise
R3. ĥ(p1 + p2,L, ρ, C,U) = min(ĥ(p1,L, ρ, C,U), ĥ(p2,L, ρ, C,U))
R4. ĥ(p1| · · · |pn,L, ρ, C,U) =⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ĥ(Unfoldx (p1| · · · |pn),L, ρ, C,U ∪ {x})
if ∃ an unguarded constant x in p1| · · · |pn with x ∈ U
0
if pi is guarded, i ∈ [1..n], and ∃i ∈ [1..n] s.t. pi = α.q,
and α ∈ ρ
1 + ĥ(p1| · · · |qk| · · · |pn,L, ρ, C,U)
if pi is guarded, i ∈ [1..n], and ∃k = min{j|pj = αj .qj, αj ∈ L ∪ ρ}
1 + ĥ(p1| · · · |q| · · · |r| · · · |pn,L, ρ, C,U)
if pi is guarded and First(pi) ⊆ L,∀i ∈ [1..n] and
∃! α ∈ L s.t. pi = α.q, pj = α.r and α,α /∈ First(pk)
∀k ∈ [1..n] k = i = j
D
otherwise
where D =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∞ if ĥ(pi,L, ρ, C,U) = ∞,∀i
n∑
i = 1,
bh(pi,L, ρ, C,U) = ∞
ĥ(pi,L, ρ, C,U) otherwise
R5. ĥ(p\L,L, ρ, C,U) = ĥ(p,L ∪ L ∪ L, ρ,C,U)
R6. ĥ(p[f ],L, ρ, C,U) = ĥ(p, f−1(L), f−1(ρ), C,U)
R7. ĥ(x,L, ρ, C,U) =
⎧⎨
⎩
∞ if 〈x,L〉 ∈ C
ĥ(p,L, ρ, C ∪ {〈x,L〉},U)) if 〈x,L〉 ∈ C and x
def
= p
Fig. 3. The bh function for SHM formulae veriﬁcation.
ĥ(〈p, ϕ〉) returns the minimum number of actions to perform before performing an
action occurring in the ﬁrst modal operator in ϕ, i.e., an action in ρ. Nodes that
S. Gradara et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 185 (2007) 93–10598
can perform actions in ρ are more promising. For p = nil (Rule R1) the function
ĥ returns ∞ since nil cannot perform actions in ρ as it is not able to perform any
action at all. When applied to α.p (Rule R2), the function returns 0 if α is the ﬁrst
action of the formula (i.e., α ∈ ρ) or if α ∈ L (since the action α could be performed
and so we optimistically return 0), otherwise the function is recursively applied for
ﬁnding, if any, an action in ρ.
When the choice of two processes is encountered (Rule R3), the minimum number
of actions before performing an action in ρ between the two components is returned.
Now, let us consider the parallel composition of processes (Rule R4). In this case,
the level of accuracy of the heuristic may vary according whether the requirement for
it to be consistent is, or not, relaxed. In this deﬁnition we choose a syntactic-based
method that, without considering all possible threads interleaving, simply returns
a (perhaps not optimal) number of non-communication actions, not belonging to ρ,
which could be performed by the threads. So, ﬁrst we unfold once the unguarded
constants occurring in the parallel composition. This can be done storing the un-
folded constants in U . Moreover, in the case where all the parallel components are
guarded, if there exists a component of the parallel composition that can perform
the ﬁrst action of the formula, i.e., an action in ρ, then 0 is returned, as the process
can perform immediately that action. Furthermore, if:
• there exists an independent component of the parallel composition, i.e., a process
that can perform a non-restricted action not belonging to ρ (pi = α.q and α ∈
L ∪ ρ); or
• all components can perform only restricted actions and there exists one and only
one pair of processes that can communicate on a restricted action and this unique
pair has the form (α.q, α.r);
then the estimated number of actions is 1 plus the value returned by a recursive
application of the function.
In all the other cases, if the ĥ-value of each process of the parallel composition is
∞, that is, each of them is not able to perform an action in ρ, so their composition
and therefore we return ∞; if not, the sum of the number of actions by each parallel
process pi is returned, without considering the processes with inﬁnite ĥ-values.
When considering a relabelled process (Rule R6), one must take as a set of ﬁrst
actions, the set f−1(ρ), and as a set of restricted actions, the set f−1(L) 4 . Finally,
(Rule R7), ∞ is returned when we encounter a constant already expanded under
the same environment (more precisely, when we encounter a constant x such that
〈x,L〉 ∈ C). In this case, no action in ρ has been found.
We explain Rule R7 through a simple example. Consider x
def
= a.y and y
def
= b.x.
Suppose that we want to verify whether x satisﬁes ϕ = 〈c〉∅ tt. We apply our
deﬁnition of ĥ with ρ = {c}. Therefore:
ĥ(x, ∅, ρ, ∅, ∅) = ĥ(a.y, ∅, ρ, {〈x, ∅〉}, ∅) (by Rule R7, 〈x, ∅〉 ∈ C)
4 Given a set of actions S, f−1(S) = {α | f(α) ∈ S}.
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= ĥ(y, ∅, ρ, {〈x, ∅〉}, ∅) (by Rule R2)
= ∞ (by Rule R7, 〈x, ∅〉 ∈ C).
The value ∞ means that the process x is not able to perform an action c.
We now explain Rule R4. Consider x
def
= a.x, y
def
= a.k1,z
def
= a.k2 and w
def
= d.w.
Suppose that we want to verify whether p = (x|y|z|w)\{a} satisﬁes ϕ = 〈c〉∅ tt.
We apply our deﬁnition of ĥ with ρ = {c}. Therefore:
ĥ(p, ∅, ρ, ∅, ∅) = ĥ(x|y|z|w, {a, a}, ρ, ∅, ∅) (by Rule R5)
= ĥ(a.x|a.k1|a.k2|d.w, {a, a}, ρ, ∅, {x, y, z, w}) (byRule R4 branch 1 four times)
= 0 (by Rule R4 branch 5).
Note that ĥ(d.w, {a, a}, ρ, ∅, {x, y, z, w}) = ∞
Once deﬁned a heuristic function we can apply a search strategy. The search
strategy expands nodes until it can deduce that the start node is a successful node
or an unsuccessful one, based on the following function test that applied to a node
n returns s if n is a successful node and u if n is an unsuccessful one:
• test(〈p, tt〉) = s;
• test(〈p, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2〉) = s if test(〈p, ϕ1〉) = s ∧ test(〈p, ϕ2〉) = s;
• test(〈p, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2〉) = s if test(〈p, ϕ1〉) = s ∨ test(〈p, ϕ2〉) = s;
• test(〈p, [K]R ϕ〉) = s if either ĥ(〈p, [K]R ϕ〉) = ∞ or test(m) = s ∀m ∈
{n′|n
α
−→n′, α ∈ R};
• test(〈p, 〈K〉R ϕ〉) = s if ∃m ∈ {n
′|n
α
−→n′, α ∈ R} such that test(m) = s.
• test(p, ff) = u;
• test(〈p, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2〉) = u if test(〈p, ϕ1〉) = u ∨ test(〈p, ϕ2〉) = u;
• test(〈p, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2〉) = u if test(〈p, ϕ1〉) = u ∧ test(〈p, ϕ2〉) = u;
• test(〈p, 〈K〉R ϕ〉) = u if either ĥ(〈p, 〈K〉R ϕ〉)) = ∞ or test(m) = u ∀m ∈
{n′|n
α
−→n′, α ∈ R};
• test(〈p, [K]R ϕ〉) = u if ∃m ∈ {n
′|n
α
−→n′, α ∈ R} such that test(m) = u.
Consider now the simple CCS process p = a.b.g.x + a.d.b.x + b.d.b.c.nil; with
x
def
= b.d.nil. The transition system for p has 11 states. Let us suppose that we want
to verify the following SHM formula:
ϕ
def
= [a]∅ 〈b〉∅ tt: “after each action a an action b can be performed”.
It holds that p satisﬁes ϕ. We note that for ϕ, visiting only 7 nodes is suﬃcient
in order to state that the formula is satisﬁed for the process p, while the standard
transition system for p has 11 states.
Let us apply our approach to the process p with the Greedy search strategy.
The node expansion terminates when enough nodes are selected to deduce whether
the start node is a successful node or an unsuccessful one, based on the deﬁnition
of the function test.
In Figure 4 the ĥ-value of each node is reported. For instance, it holds that
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h
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b
db
Fig. 4. A simple example with Greedy and bh.
ĥ(〈S1
5 , 〈b〉∅ tt〉) = 0 meaning that process S1 can immediately perform the ﬁrst
action of the corresponding formula, that is b. Applying the Greedy search strategy,
ﬁrst we expand the node 〈p, ϕ〉: three states are generated: 〈S1, 〈b〉∅ tt〉, 〈S2, 〈b〉∅ tt〉
and 〈S3, ϕ〉 (see Figure 4(a)). In both ﬁgures, 4(a) and 4(b) the shaded nodes rep-
resent the states to be expanded. Then, we choose to expand ﬁrst 〈S1, 〈b〉∅ tt〉
that has the least h-value (equal to 0), generating 〈S4, tt〉, and then 〈S2, 〈b〉∅ tt〉,
whose h-value is equal to 1. Finally, we expand 〈S5, 〈b〉∅ tt〉, with h-value equal
to 0, generating 〈S6, tt〉 (see Figure 4(b)). Based on the deﬁnition of success-
ful/unsuccessful node, since 〈S4, tt〉, 〈S6, tt〉 and 〈S3, ϕ〉 are successful nodes, we
can stop the construction of the transition system stating that the process p satisﬁes
the formula ϕ.
4 Experimental Results
The proposed approach has been implemented in a tool that is an extension of
DELFIN+ (DEadloack FINder) [18,19]. In fact, the previous version of the tool was
speciﬁc for deadlock detection, providing a set of heuristics to be used with informed
search strategies like A*, IDA* and Greedy. The added functionality includes the
possibility to verify CCS processes against any kind of formula expressed in the
selective Hennessy-Milner logic, by applying the formula-based heuristic presented
in Section 3.
We run some experiments on an Intel Pentium 4 with a 2.80 GHz processor and
1 GB of RAM, and, in general, could observe encouraging results. We selected from
the literature a sample of well known systems and some interesting properties to be
veriﬁed, which are described below.
Multicast Protocol for Mobile Computing (MPMC):a protocol for reli-
able multicast in distributed mobile systems, presented in [2,3]. On this system we
checked the following two SHM formulae:
ϕ1 = [deliver(m,msg)]{send(msg)} ff
5 S1 = b.g.x.
S. Gradara et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 185 (2007) 93–105 101
expressing the property that any multicast delivered by a group member has been
originated by a group member; and
ϕ2 = [deliver(m,msg)]∅ [deliver(m,msg)]∅ ff
expressing the property that no group member delivers duplicate multicasts, i.e.
duplicates are discarded. Both properties are true and the size of the labelled
transition systems constructed by the Concurrency Workbench of the New Century
(CWB-NC) [11] consists of 4, 815 states. With our tool, property ϕ1 was veriﬁed
after 146 generated states while for property ϕ2 no reduction was obtained.
GRID: two processes on a grid 5 × 5 of relay stations which allow them to
communicate. This example is taken from [6]. On this system we considered the
trivial SHM formula ϕ1 =< connected >∅ tt, expressing the property that there
exists a path to connect the two processes. The property is satisﬁed. The CWB-NC
fails to verify any formula on that process as its labelled transition system is too
big to be loaded. With our tool, we veriﬁed the formula with two processes initially
positioned at (1, 1) and (5, 5) respectively, and the true result was given after 11, 509
generated states.
MUTUAL: a system handling the requests of a resource shared by 10 pro-
cesses. It presents two alternative choices between a server based on a round robin
scheduling and a server based on mutual exclusion. On this system we checked the
following two SHM formulae
ϕ1 = [roundrobin]∅ [worki+1]{worki} ff
ϕ2 = [worki+1]{worki} ff
ϕ1 expresses the property that when a server based on a round robin scheduling
is chosen, process i + 1 cannot use the resource before process i. This property
is satisﬁed, instead the system does not satisfy ϕ2 expressing the property that, in
general, process i+1 cannot use the resource before process i. The CWB-NC builds
a system consisting of 32, 768 states, while with our tool, with i = 1, we managed
to verify formula ϕ1 after 13, 824 generated states and formula ϕ2 after 89 states.
Philips Bounded Retransmission Protocol (BRP): the Bounded Retrans-
mission Protocol used by the Philips Company in one of its products [17,21,22]. On
this system we checked the following two SHM formulae:
ϕ1 = [in(d1 di)]∅ [in(ok)]{out(di,ok)} ff
ϕ2 = [in(d1 di)]∅ 〈in(nok)〉∅ tt
The formula ϕ1 means that, after accepting a data packet of length i, the protocol
cannot issue an ok conﬁrmation (action in(ok)) to the sending client unless the last
segment of the packet (action out(di, ok)) has been delivered to the receiving client.
The formula ϕ2 means that, after accepting a data packet of length i, the protocol
can issue a nok conﬁrmation (action in(nok)) to the sending client. Both properties
are satisﬁed. The size of the labelled transition system computed by the CWB-NC
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is of 759 states, while with our tool, with i = 3, we could verify ϕ1 after 558 states
and ϕ2 after 34 states.
Solid State Interlocking (SSI): the British Rail’s Solid State Interlocking
(SSI) whose speciﬁcation is given in [7]. This system is devoted “to adjust, at the
request of the signal operator, the setting of signal and points in the railway to
permit the safe passage of trains.” On this system we checked the folowing SHM
formula ϕ1 = [det]{fail} ff. The formula means that a failure is detected only if it
has actually occurred. The system does not satisfy ϕ1. For that process, the CWB-
NC constructs a labelled transition system of 3, 616 states while with our tool we
could verify the formula to be false after generation of 361 states.
Solitaire Game (SG): a CCS speciﬁcation of a solitaire game [4], developed
by Luca Aceto (available at [1]). This system satisﬁes the following SHM formula:
ϕ1 = 〈w1, w2, w3, b5, b6, b7〉∅ tt. The labelled transition systems of this process by
the CWB-NC consists of 3, 107 states but our tool employed 431 states to verify ϕ1.
In addition to those processes, for a better evaluation of our heuristic we con-
sidered a deadlocked version of the dining philosophers process and checked the
possibility for one speciﬁc philosopher to eat. We did this on several instances of
that process, i.e., by increasing the number of philosophers. The results of all runs
are reported in Table 1: n is the number of philosophers and the ﬁgures indicate
the number of generated states to verify the formula in the corresponding run, both
by our tool with Greedy search and by the CWB-NC.
n 5 7 9 11 13 15 20 . 30
Greedy 177 440 816 1389 2055 2847 5387 . 12867
CWB-NC 2404 54142 − − − − − − −
Table 1
Results on the dining philosophers
As one can see from the table, the CWB-NC is not able to load the process from
n = 9 on, while with our tool we managed to model check even a conﬁguration of
30 philosophers.
5 Related work and Conclusion
In this paper we presented a method and a tool for directed model checking applied
to concurrent systems described as CCS processes. The properties (both weak-
liveness and safety) to be veriﬁed are expressed in the Selective Hennessy-Milner
logic [5], which is a branching-time logic. The eﬃciency of the proposed approach is
shown on some examples, well known in literature, where the Greedy strategy has
been applied together with the heuristic of Figure 3.
The work most closely related to this is presented in [12] where the authors
propose a heuristic approach based on the structure of the LTL (Linear Temporal
Logic) properties to be veriﬁed. However, their work focuses on liveness properties
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and invariant and assertion errors. The approach in [12] is further reﬁned with
Bayesian reasoning in [31] where the focus is not the study and the deﬁnition of
heuristics but the application of statistical methods to improve the expected behav-
ior of guided search. This is obtained by interpreting heuristic estimates as random
variables rather than point values. In [13], a Hamming Distance heuristic has been
used to guide the error search in SPIN. This technique requires that a speciﬁc state
of the system, in which an error occurs, is identiﬁed initially; the Hamming Distance
between that state and the current system state is then used to guide the search
for a short counterexample that reaches the given violation state. In [24] heuristics
have been applied to the validation of communication protocols. Some kinds of
safety properties, like absence of deadlock, are considered.
In a precursor paper [30] one of the authors combines AO* [27] with local model
checking to verify CCS processes. This was the ﬁrst initiative to veriﬁcation by di-
rected model checking, providing an example of heuristic function. As an extension
to that work, we presented another heuristic function deﬁnition that can be easily
tailored to deadlock detection. In fact, in [19] the authors propose deadlock-speciﬁc
heuristics and their eﬃciency is analyzed on several examples through DELFIN+.
Thus, once deﬁned the heuristic function, and based on the formula, several heuris-
tic search strategies can be used (Greedy, A*, IDA*, AO* etc.). Finally, other
well-known reduction techniques, such as partial order, compositional reasoning,
abstraction, can be applied as an alternative to local model checking.
As a future work we intend to proceed with analyzing more accurate heuristic
functions and to deepen the evaluation of the method on other case studies. We
are interested in combining this approach with abstraction techniques, in order to
achieve further improvements.
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